> These enforceable, bright-line rules will ban paid prioritization, and the blocking and throttling of lawful content and services.
My concern is, how are they going to define lawful content and services, and more importantly, how are they going to determine it in practice? It can easily translate into some heavy handed surveillance systems which analyze the lawfulness of the whole network.
That's not a decision the FCC gets to make. Congress and the courts ultimately decide what is considered lawful content. These rules need to withstand changes that Congress might enact in the future. If Congress decides to force ISPs to block a certain kind of traffic, the FCC cannot disallow ISPs from blocking it with their rules.
They basically just include the word 'lawful' to allow ISPs to block unlawful traffic. Think specifically of DDOS attacks, you wouldn't want to disallow an ISP from blackholing DDOS packets.
> That's not a decision the FCC gets to make. Congress and the courts ultimately decide what is considered lawful content.
Actually, once the FCC adopts a no-blocking-lawful-content rule, any alleged violation of that rule is potentially a subject of FCC action, which means that the FCC will, in the first instance, determine all relevant questions, including whether particular content is lawful. They will, of course, look at and apply court precedent and statute law to determine that, but the FCC absolutely will be called on to make that decision.
Those decisions, of course, may be appealed to the court in the same way as any other enforcement action by a regulatory body.
Right, but what we're worrying about is an ISP blocking, say, all torrent traffic. Hey, it's obviously 'unlawful' right? We will see. Overall, I am very optimistic about this announcement.
They might - some already do (block or throttle torrent traffic, that is).
The difference is that right now if your ISP blocks torrent traffic you have literally no recourse besides going to a competitor (if one exists, which odds are one does not). You are after all not legally entitled to torrent traffic.
The change here is that if an ISP unilaterally starts blocking torrent traffic, you (or more likely, the EFF or similar org) can sue to have torrent traffic declared lawful, after which the ISP is legally bound to open the traffic.
The trick here isn't that ISP shitty behavior will be impossible under the new rules, but rather that there will be more power to the citizenry to combat many categories such shitty behavior.
Depends on how it's worded. If blocking lawful traffic is banned, then blocking a whole protocol that you don't know the contents of is unlawful. There might have to be some clarification around intent, but there are certainly many laws for which "I didn't think I was breaking the law" is an invalid defense.
> I know that, and you know that. I'm not so sure about Comcat or Commissioner Wheeler.
Since FCC action against Comcast for blocking Bittorrent -- including the idea that Bittorrent, whatever unlawful content might be distributed by that means, was itself not unlawful and that Bittorrent traffic included lawful content -- was one of the starting points of net neutrality regulation at the FCC, I'm pretty sure that Wheeler, the FCC in general, and Comcast are all aware of that.
> Right, but what we're worrying about is an ISP blocking, say, all torrent traffic.
You do know that that's one of the earliest things the FCC addressed in the "net neutrality" / "open internet" space, even before the first attempt to adopt generally-applicable rules rather than case-by-case enforcement of net neutrality principles?
The devil in the details is whether or not this will be proactive. E.g. what happens if Comcast decides to block a service claiming that it is unlawful? Does said service need to wind its way through the courts to gain access to Comcast customers? Or does Comcast need to wait until the service is deemed unlawful by the courts before actually blocking?
This is an absolutely valid question, but it also has a flip-side: what obligation does law enforcement have to regulate content that you and I, as open-Internet believers, agree is unlawful? Shall we allow illegal content in order to err on the side of caution?
The question was about unlawful content. The NSA isn't particularly interested in unlawful content, its surveillance has a goal of intelligence gathering rather than detection of unlawful content.
I understand the NSA is associated with all kinds of serious issues, but it doesn't help us figure anything else out when the subject changes to NSA even when it doesn't really apply.
The point is not about content and NSA, but about surveillance. I.e. it's already here, and tools for it are here as well. I wouldn't see it as a far stretch if all the same tools would be used for all kind of unlawful content hunting. Why should they reinvent the wheel?
"What obligation does law enforcement have to regulate content that you and I, as open-Internet believers, agree is unlawful? Shall we allow illegal content in order to err on the side of caution?"
That question wasn't about surveillance. You keep changing the subject to surveillance, because you're unwilling to address the issue of whether we should allow illegal content.
What obligation does law enforcement have to regulate content? Not surveillance. Not NSA. Law enforcement. obligation.To regulate content.
Show we allow illegal content in order to err on the side of caution? Not should we allow surveillance. Should we allow illegal content. Content. Not surveillance. Stop changing the subject.
It was about surveillance. If you don't understand that, think again. To make it easier:
> What obligation does law enforcement have to regulate content that you and I, as open-Internet believers, agree is unlawful?
Translation: what obligation does law enforcement has to police Internet with surveillance in order to catch content that we agree is unlawful? Same can be asked about ISPs.
> Shall we allow illegal content in order to err on the side of caution?"
Translation: should we oppose massive surveillance to prevent power abuse even if it will prevent catching unlawful content?
To that I answered, that current surveillance is already abusive, so the question doesn't really start.
The question was whether we should allow unlawful content for the sake of erring on the side of caution. You seem completely unwilling to discuss or take any stance on this issue. You want to talk about surveillance, and you say it's the same thing. It's not the same thing. You aren't discussing the question which was put to you.
For example, child porn is an important form of unlawful content that many people do not want to allow. We might decide that the civil liberty issues are so important that we are just going to have to put up with more child porn than we'd have under a more restrictive regime. Or we might not. Either answer would pertain to the question.
But end surveillance now, NSA, it's all the same rah-rah doesn't pertain to the question.
> You seem completely unwilling to discuss or take any stance on this issue.
No, the question was, should we accept surveillance as acceptable way to prevent unlawful content. And my answer was that this question is invalid - surveillance is already here, whether you want to accept it or not. If that didn't imply surveillance, what other caution are you talking about then?
Surveillance != censorship, particularly when the surveillance is supposed to be a secret. You can argue that it prompts people to self-censor, or that it actually isn't supposed to be secret, but you can't argue that Room 641A is evidence of censorship.
Better examples would be the DMCA, the FBI's seizure of child porn-related domains, the seizure of Silk Road, etc. Those things are actually censorship. Having CC processors cut off Wikileaks was also slightly indirect censorship but still pretty much censorship.
We already do these things, and under the 1st amendment, there are very few things that don't fit under "lawful content" so I doubt this would change much.
They are close kin. Censorship uses surveillance to find what to censor. That's why it's not accidental that DRM cartels are so into police state mentality. These issues essentially converge.
> particularly when the surveillance is supposed to be a secret.
What difference does it make if it's a secret or not if it's there? Both are a problem when they are massive. Secret surveillance is even worse, since it makes people think that there is no problem with it. Compare it to obtrusive and non obtrusive DRM. People are easily annoyed by the former, but often are often OK with the later because they don't feel discomfort. So the second is actually much worse.
I disagree. People under surveillance self-censor. A recent study showed journalists censoring themselves in response to surveillance (i.e., their communications). Another showed that people's searches on search engines (or maybe just Google) changed after revelations of government surveillance.
It's not an accident. It's a well-known phenomenon and a method of intimidation.
(Sorry I don't have time to look up the details of those studies.)
My concern is, how are they going to define lawful content and services, and more importantly, how are they going to determine it in practice? It can easily translate into some heavy handed surveillance systems which analyze the lawfulness of the whole network.