Would you mind listing these “primary sources”? Until you do that here are some of my sources [0], [1] and [2]
[0] https://russianforces.org/RussianStrategicNuclearForcesC2Pag... page 61-62 see references to authorization codes required for launch in retaliation . See page 64 for launching retaliatory strike when supreme command has been eliminated- again authorization codes are required.
[1] https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0297russians/ References the January 25 1995 incident when Boris Yeltsin activated the Kazbek command and authorization system as a result of a false alarm. Again: authorization from supreme command is required
Ah, you put me on the spot! Here's what i can dig up in short order.
Reed, Thomas C. At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War. Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2004
relevant quote (from 1992):
> The Soviets were well aware of nuclear weapon safety issues. Even though that subject touches on the internals of weapon design, they were willing to talk and seek advice. They discussed the merits of their transportation containers, which they felt to be superior to U.S. models, and they confirmed that their weapons were “disabled” when in storage, whatever that meant. On the other hand, security (preventing theft or misuse) was a new subject to them. Throughout the Soviet system nuclear weapons had been secured by operational means: people watching people who watched still other people. The Soviets confirmed that there were no electronic or mechanical locking devices on their weapons (as there are in the U.S.), a subject that grew to be of enormous concern as the KGB disappeared, the army disintegrated, and well-financed terrorists infiltrated the country.
> There are two ways to do this. One way is to use a mechanical device, which prevents the arming of the weapon unless the proper code is entered. In the United States, such devices, used extensively on U.S. weapons, are called Permissive Action Links (PALs). The other way is to use specially selected personnel in an organization separate from the military to maintain weapons control. This method was used in the old Soviet Union and is still used by Russia. India must decide on the combination of these two methods that it wants to use.
Interesting report from Sweden's defense research agency in 2005 - concluding that no-one knows if Russia's tactical nukes have PALs (majority of warheads in UA were tactical) - https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--1588--SE
I hope this at least shows that it's not quite as settled a question as some make out! And I realize these aren't quite as "primary" as I had remembered; I thought they had more direct quotes, but I do find these sources quite credible.
[0] https://russianforces.org/RussianStrategicNuclearForcesC2Pag... page 61-62 see references to authorization codes required for launch in retaliation . See page 64 for launching retaliatory strike when supreme command has been eliminated- again authorization codes are required.
[1] https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0297russians/ References the January 25 1995 incident when Boris Yeltsin activated the Kazbek command and authorization system as a result of a false alarm. Again: authorization from supreme command is required
[2] https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-05/russian-nuclear-weap... section Russia’s nuclear strategy and its war in Ukraine again mentions authorization codes are required for nuclear strike