In terms of military resources required, there's a vast difference between keeping a close eye on the other side's few known airfields, and keeping a close eye on every park, parking lot, farm field, forest clearing, etc., etc. in their country.
The very successful attack that Ukraine performed on Russian long range bombers would have never worked if those weren't tied to particular locations for a really long time. 6 months of planning and execution would have gone out of the window by a single late (as in the last 30 days) order to move things around. All airfields are now at risk of such attacks, including civilian ones.
I would bet that within a year we'll see ransom attacks on airfields in open societies. The idea is out there and the capabilities are so cheap that any idiot could do it.
The schedules, radar frequencies, etc. of those commercial satellites are all public knowledge.
(Based on timestamps) your reference is to user cutemonster's comment. Yep - "move immediately after the satellite passes" is a game that children can master. I would put a bit more weight on user walrus01's (later) sibling comment - on the problem of distinguishing small, pop-up air bases from routine civilian activities.
Also, I suspect that very few of those commercial satellite radars have much resilience in the face of jamming. That is expensive and security-sensitive tech on the satellite operator's end, of minimal use to most users of the satellites' services. Vs. in a war zone, the diplomatic consequences of using cheap (relative to getting hit) ECM against surveillance satellites will usually be the lesser evil.
