I am also not an immigration lawyer. In Maslenjak v. United States (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf), eight justices disagreed with the expansive interpretation of the statute you describe. From the majority opinion, "The statute Congress passed, most naturally read, strips a person of citizenship not when she committed any illegal act during the naturalization process, but only when that act played some role in her naturalization." and "Suppose that an applicant for citizenship fills out the paperwork in a government office with a knife tucked away in her handbag. She has violated the law against possessing a weapon in a federal building, and she has done so in the course of procuring citizenship, but nobody would say she has “procure[d]” her citizenship “contrary to law.” That is because the violation of law and the acquisition of citizenship in that example are merely coincidental: The one has no causal relation to the other."
So that case involves 28 USC 1425, which doesn’t have an expressly-stated materiality requirement. The holding of the case is that, nonetheless, the statute requires an omission or misrepresentation to be material, which the Court defines as information “that would have mattered to an immigration official.”
8 USC 1451(a) has an express materiality requirement, which I addressed in my comment. The standard of what “would have mattered to an immigration official” can be seen extremely broadly in view of 8 USC 1427(a). In the context of the false statements statute, 18 USC 1001, material facts are those that have the “tendency” to influence the decision maker, but need not actually influence the decision. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
The materiality requirement provides some protection. It’s doubtful revocation could be premised on someone having illegally parked their car when going into a USCIS interview. But the standard for materiality is still quite expansive and leaves a lot of room for aggressive prosecutors.
