I'd focus on your previous point about second-strike capabilities.
> Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated.
Yes, but the goal isn't to win a first strike, it's MAD to prevent the other side doing that.
Russia has enough warheads to not just level Poland's cities, but every settlement and forest in the country.
Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack.
This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)
> Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack.
If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument.
> This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)
Absolutely, but the issue is that this takes A LOT of time to build and implement, and a country like Poland or Germany cannot build that kind of capability overnight. Yet a nuclear program can be viewed as an existential threat that can be used as a causus belli for war (conventional or nuclear).
This is a pretty bad RoI.
Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare.
And this is why you never hear Polish or German military leadership talk about developing a nuclear program.
> If you are in a situation where you are even seriously considering a nuclear strike, that means you are viewing a threat as existential, which completely undermines the economic argument.
No, because it's not symmetric.
Party A may be an existential threat to party B, party B can prevent that existential threat just by being sufficiently painful. B doesn't even have to be close to an existential threat to A for it to be painful enough to reconsider.
That's how bees keep humans away from hives. Also how the Irish kicked my great-grandparents generation out of controlling Ireland, even at the height of the British empire.
> Nuclear programs are expensive, and instead of spending the amount you would need to build a nuclear program, it's much better for Poland and Germany to double down and concentrate on conventional war capabilities such as rocket systems, drones, artillery, and heavy weapons. The fact that a country with an ossified MIC like Ukraine is able to bog down a military like Russia's with conventional capabilities is proof enough that doubling down on building conventional war-fighting capabilities is enough to cause severe pain on an aggressor while not turning a conflict into an existential one which justifies nuclear warfare.
Yes, they are expensive. Also, I expect a multi-polar nuclear arms race to go hot much more easily, to normalise their use, to generally be bad for everyone.
So I hope you are correct (or, more importantly, that your opinion is shared by decision makers). On the other, there's clearly a constant undercurrent of "let's not give too much more aid to Ukraine just in case the Russian nukes actually work", so I don't think it's seen that way.
> German military leadership
Given the local attitudes towards even nuclear reactors, I think it's just a political non-starter around here. (I'll have to wait and see if @TeMPOraL sees this and responds regarding Poland's politics?)
> So I hope you are correct (or, more importantly, that your opinion is shared by decision makers)
Yep. I'm basing my stance on Poland's current defense strategy [0][1].
Furthermore, Poland's on track to outcompete Russia in rocket artillery and tanks, so it has day 1 capabilities that are comparable to a tactical nuclear strike minus the cost.
> No, because it's not symmetric
Yep. It isn't symmetric, but it doesn't matter, because crossing the nuclear launch threshold is enough to justify retaliatory strikes and counter-strikes - which is something a state which lacks a second strike or nuclear triad cannot deter against.
And the Kargil War in 1999 was proof enough that two states having nuclear weapons capabilities alone cannot deter a war.
It's not existenial if you don't have anyone on the other side of the "deal" to offer nuclear strikes in return. So far, it's been the US, but that doesn't seem assured for the future anymore.
It takes decades to build credible second strike or nuclear triad capabilities. A conventional war would be finished well before that.
For example, to launch into Russia, Poland and Germany would need Tactical, SR, MR, and LR Ballistic Missiles, but neither state has a ballistic missiles program so they would need to start from scratch or be entirely dependent on France (which the defense industry in both states have lobbied against).
If a Poland or Germany attempts to begin a nuclear weapons program, that is reason enough for a belligerent nation like Russia to start a war.
If you are as close neighbours as Poland and Russia, you get first and second strike "for free".
Launch 3000 drones at once and let one in a thousand carry a nuke.
Not having nukes didn't protect Georgia or Ukraine from war and invasion. This is just more "let's not provoke them". Well, that doesn't work very well, does it? It's time someone pushed back and called their bluff. Because if it's not a bluff we are screwed anyway. In this case, the only way to not lose is to play.
> Even if Moscow or St Petersburg are completely wiped off the map, Novosibirsk, Kazan, Omsk, etc will remain while much of Poland is irradiated.
Yes, but the goal isn't to win a first strike, it's MAD to prevent the other side doing that.
Russia has enough warheads to not just level Poland's cities, but every settlement and forest in the country.
Poland with 10 credible nuclear weapons is enough to break the economic back of any country who attacks, so they won't attack.
This needs what you said before, second-strike capability. Either that or a fast enough response time that they can launch while hostile missiles are still inbound. (Or does that still count as second-strike?)