Arguably the feature that makes kidnappings for ransom unattractive isn't necessarily traditional banks being trusted, but rather that traditional bank transfers are usually reversible (e.g. due to a court order).
I haven't usually been enthusiastic about GNU Taler's "senders should be anonymous but recipients shouldn't" approach, but I guess kidnapping for ransom is an example where that policy might be beneficial.
I guess is comes down to whether you think it's possible to prevent this kind of thing with nothing more than cleverly aligned incentives and cleverly applied cryptography.
If it is, then we'd be fools not to try, and having the trusted third party is just the better of several bad alternatives.
But it is a pretty audacious claim. I wish there were more radical optimists among us pursuing such things. Pity that that's not what most crypto is these days.
If Trump saw the potential in crypto that I see. He'd like it far less. e.g I've been tinkering with a protocol for refusing to pay federal taxes all at once. (Because it's not a useful threat if we're not united in it).
I draw a pretty thick line between what we're seeing out of it today and what we should be demanding of it.
I’m a big 2A supporter but would still want the would-be kidnapper to be deterred by other means. I can be incapacitated or caught unaware, JP Morgan and Charles Schwab cannot.