I agree with other commenters that the meaning is clear. But I think they underestimate how far the Supreme Court is willing to go to torture the meaning of the Constitution. Hopefully I am wrong.
I think if you want to defend Griswold you are forced to defend Lochner. If “emanations from penumbras” is a legitimate source of constitutional authority that can override democratically enacted laws, that has sweeping implications. Clearly the constitution has an overriding focus on property rights and economic liberty. What freedoms can you find in the “emanations from penumbras” of the contract clause or the takings clause?
I don’t think Griswold is wrong per se. Rather, I think it’s based on a libertarian view of the Constitution that almost none of Griswold’s proponents actually support.
I wouldn't. The wording of the 14th Amendment is ambiguous and was arguably misinterpreted by the courts.
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, AND (capitalized for emphasis) subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
If they can get the SCOTUS to reconsider United States v. Wong Kim Ark from 1898 it could go either way - the court is conservative and public sentiment has shifted.
I still think it's extremely unlikely. In other immigration contexts, "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" has been interpreted to exclude only diplomats and those not subject to the laws of the U.S. even though they are in the U.S. So children born in the U.S. to diplomats aren't considered citizens at birth.
The same is true for people born into war zones not fully under US control. I still wouldn't write this off. All it takes is a compelling argument for a new interpretation of "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof".
It's pretty easy to make a compelling argument.
The 14th Amendment was intended to address the citizenship status of freed slaves and their descendants post-Civil War. It was not meant to apply to the children of immigrants, particularly those who were not legally present or had not pledged allegiance to the U.S.
A stricter interpretation of "subject to the jurisdiction." means it should require complete, exclusive allegiance to the U.S., which might not apply to children of undocumented immigrants due to their parents' legal status or nationality.
You could also argue that the current interpretation dilutes national sovereignty by automatically bestowing citizenship without a clear reciprocal pledge of allegiance from the parents.
The fact that children of diplomats do not automatically gain citizenship due to not being "subject to the jurisdiction" in the fullest sense could be expanded to include children of undocumented immigrants, arguing that these parents, too, are outside full U.S. jurisdiction.
Finally, United States v. Wong Kim Ark was decided under different circumstances. The socio-political context has changed. This could be used to justify revisiting the original interpretation.
Are you seriously suggesting that undocumented immigrants are immune from US jurisdiction in some respect? This sounds like a reverse version of the odd legal theories proffered by sovereign citizens as to why they should not be subject to judgements in US courts.
What does “subject to the jurisdiction of” mean? Everyone seems to be equating that with diplomatic immunity, but that seems to arise from the state department’s historical interpretation of the term in determining citizenship of children of foreign diplomats.
Wong Kim Ark doesn’t answer the question, because it doesn’t even try to interpret the term. Instead it assumes that the framers of the 14th amendment meant to incorporate English common law of citizenship. Maybe that’s true, but that’s not what the Court thought the term meant in the Slaughterhouse Cases two decades before that.
Justice Harlan also had a well reasoned dissent in that case, noting that English common law on citizenship arose out of feudalism and wasn’t necessarily an appropriate source on the question.
I think it’s unlikely this will get overturned, but it’s not a frivolous argument.
Wong Kim Ark cites, at length, Marshall's discourse on jurisdiction in Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, which turns entirely on this question. It also notes the language change between the Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment, where the revision clarified precisely this issue. It's a frivolous argument. Would you like to put some money on this? I'd give you favorable odds at 7-2, assuming the court composition remains as it is now.
It’s not clear to me that “jurisdiction” is being used in the same context in the 14th amendment as in Schooner Exchange.
Regardless, I wouldn’t call an argument supported by clear dicta in one Supreme Court case and a solid dissent in another “frivolous.” But I’d put the odds of the Supreme Court ruling in Trump’s favor substantially below 10%. You lose 100% of the shots you don’t take, though.
I feel we could usefully keep in mind another observation of Marshall's quoted in Wong Kim Ark, seperate from his writings in Schooner Exchange mentioned above:
"It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court* is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated."
* The question in Slaughterhouse cases being on the topic of whether the 14th Amendment automatically subsumed the legislative authority of states in important respects, rather than the eligibility of children of foreign nationals for US citizenship.
Sure, maybe the Slaughterhouse Cases dicta was just wrong. But maybe there is something in the historical use of “jurisdiction” that sheds more light on what “subject to the jurisdiction” means. I haven’t done the deep dive myself, I’m just unpersuaded by the common law argument in Wong Kim Ark unless that really is all the historical record leaves us to go on.
It's not murky, I just picked the most official source. There's no real enforcement of selective service, except that if you don't sign up for it likely bars from subsequent employment by the Federal government unless you can get a waiver.
In practice, immigrants aren't conscripted during a draft.
We haven't had a draft since the 1970s. It's unclear how many draftees were immigrants back then (and the legal definitions around immigration have changed in the meantime) but historically conscription of immigrants has been the norm, not the exception.
Voting, Jury Service, Employment Authorization, and Driver's licenses.
These seem like things from which undocumented immigrants are excluded (by law!), not immunized. Why you think this is an argument in favor of your legal theory is beyond me.
The correct legal term is "illegal aliens" not "undocumented immigrants".
My argument is that the phrase "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" may be interpreted to mean that individuals must be under the complete, allegiance-owing jurisdiction of the United States, and because they may not be for a host of reasons, the SCOTUS may reevaluate US v Wong Kim Ark and reinterpret the 14th amendment.
There's also this 1866 Congressional document discussing the 14th after it was passed detailing "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof". It reads "This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of embassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but it will include every other class of persons." https://x.com/pepesgrandma/status/1057514062899277824/photo/...
> A stricter interpretation of "subject to the jurisdiction." means it should require complete, exclusive allegiance to the U.S., which might not apply to children of undocumented immigrants due to their parents' legal status or nationality.
This would imply that neither jus soli nor jus sanguinis citizenship would be applied to the children of US citizens who hold dual citizenship, that wouldn't fly at all, given that it would leave such folks entirely stateless.
> The socio-political context has changed.
This does not matter to a textualist reading of the constitution, which the majority of members of the current court claim to apply.
> The fact that children of diplomats do not automatically gain citizenship due to not being "subject to the jurisdiction" in the fullest sense could be expanded to include children of undocumented immigrants, arguing that these parents, too, are outside full U.S. jurisdiction.
The counter to this is that undocumented immigrants would be totally outside of the jurisdiction of any US legal enforcement except for deportation. The local police cannot arrest or detain someone who is outside of their jurisdiction. If a parent is outside of the US jurisdiction, they have some equivalent of diplomatic immunity. You can't say "you're under jurisdiction of the US for law enforcement purposes, but not for immigration purposes".
I am not an immigration lawyer, but I am very interested in immigration law and the effort to overturn this precedent in particular, an interest whch goes back more than 15 years; so I have done a lot of reading on this argument.
The whole phrase about 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof' refers to the fact that foreign diplomats (and often, their families) are not subject to the jurisdiction of their countries of residence, a concept known as diplomatic immunity. This sometimes leads to people with diplomatic privileges avoiding legal consequences that would otherwise result in fines or custodial sentences, as in this recent case: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Harry_Dunn
Regular, not-diplomatic people of foreign origin who are in the US are subject to the jurisdiction of US courts like anyone else. I have never found any legal justification for the opposite view other than the intense desire of the proponent for things to be different. Usually people who want to sweep aside this precedent rely on an 18th century book called The Law of Nations by Swiss legal theorist Emer Vattel, which opts for a concept of de jure (naturalized) citizenship rather than jus soli (of the soil) citizenship as exists here and in some other countries. They argue that it was a very popular book in its day and that Washington, Jefferson, and other founders of the US had certainly read it. when asked why they didn't just write this into the Constitution you usually get a hand-wavey answer about how it was so obvious they didn't see any need (at best) or the person just stops responding or gets mad (at worst).
> All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
> The first observation we have to make on this clause is that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, "subject to its jurisdiction" was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.
As has been noted in other responses to you: Dicta are just that, dicta. Moreover, the Reconstruction-era Slaughterhouse Cases arose in the context of the defeated South's often-violent, century-long attempts to preserve "states' rights" (read: white supremacy). Limiting the reach of the 14th Amendment was one facet of that project; Louisiana's lawyer in the case was a prominent opponent of Reconstruction. The Court's 5-4 judgment has long since been shitcanned [0]; in the modern era it's palpably frivolous to cite its dicta as support.
In any event: Longstanding actual practice has followed the conventional interpretation of "subject to the jurisdiction"; see, e.g., former British prime minister Boris Johnson, who was born in NYC to British citizens and thus had to pay U.S.-citizen taxes until he renounced his citizenship. [1]
Finally, as has also been noted: No sane person would assert with a straight face that a suspected thief, murderer, or unsafe driver was immune from arrest and prosecution in the U.S., merely because s/he happened to be born in the U.S. to undocumented parents and therefore was supposedly not "subject to the jurisdiction."
The Slaughterhouse Cases were decided just five years after the enactment of the 14th amendment, and the judgment is obviously correct and has never been overruled. And the dissent was obviously nuts in suggesting that the 14th amendment protected butchers from state economic regulation.
I'll confess error in my wording above (and it's too late to edit it): The judgment (outcome) was arguably correct, as you say — state governments should indeed be able to do reasonable public-safety regulation.
(Whether Louisiana's action in granting a private monopoly on meat processing was a reasonable way to promote public safety was another question: The Court's opinion focused on the 14th Amendment and federal privileges and immunities vs. those under state law.)
The 5-4 majority's rationale went too far: As the opinion says, the Reconstruction Amendments (13 through 15) were intended to hem in state governments — notably but not exclusively those of the South, which by and large were dominated (often through murderous mob- and militia violence) by white, racist, recent- and still-aspiring enslavers — but the majority left the door too open to the possibility of states'-rights arguments. [0]
It's just the same old bullshit in a new wrapper. Cherry-picked quotes from Congressional debates, a bunch of cases in between the passage of teh amendment and Wong Kim Ark, and then it launches into handwaving with arguments like
The American Revolution was, by its inherent nature and through
its express principles, an effective throwing off of the common
law’s yoke of jus soli and its perpetual allegiance in favor of a
consent-based compact theory of government.
and a page later it's special pleading for Grotius, Emer Vattel, and compact theory. I gave up at that point. Perhaps there's some brilliant new theory buried in the last 1/3 of the article, but if you didn't think it worth reading in detail I'm not inclined to mine it for you!
To be honest, the fact that it's from the Heritage foundation and published in a very conservative journal of law and politics give it a double flavor of polemic rather than scholarship. One can construct eloquent arguments for anything, from reinstating dred Scott to invalidating the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent formation of the USA - and indeed in this age of LLMs I expect legal polemics further proliferate. But when you get down to the actual substantive arguments, this paper strikes me as just another of the 'we wish things were different' type, wishing that the US had built its jurisprudential edifice on a continental rather than a common law substrate. Perhaps if the proponents of this idea invested their efforts in amending the Constitution (or going the Conventional route) they might have more success in building the required consensus.
> To be honest, the fact that it's from the Heritage foundation and published in a very conservative journal of law and politics give it a double flavor of polemic rather than scholarship
I’ll respond to your other point, but 90% of legal academia thinks “emanations from penumbras” is constitutional law. They’re wingnuts and kooks too. Nobody has the color of authority here. We gotta reconstruct the correct answer from first principles.
I'm (legitimately) curious: how does one square the concept of not being subject to US jurisdiction for citizenship purposes, with being subject to US jurisdiction for law enforcement purposes?
In all other exceptions to the 14th amendment, either you are dealing with an invading army, or you are dealing with people who have diplomatic immunity, all cases where they are not subject to American Civil law (and law enforcement). So how does the court thread the needle to allow law enforcement to interact with folks who it is claiming are not subject to US jurisdiction?
It’s not obvious to me that “jurisdiction” could only mean “law enforcement jurisdiction” in 1868.
Wong Kim Ark cited Schooner Exchange, which explained that nations have absolute jurisdiction over persons on their territory. It framed the cases you’re talking about, those having diplomatic immunity, as being a waiver of jurisdiction that was customary under international law.
Yep, it's pretty nonsensical. Presumably those that hold the view that children of undocumented immigrants born in the United States are not citizens also hold they view that they are immune to prosecution for crimes by the United States for the same reason, but they don't seem to talk about that much.
It is only ambiguous read in a vacuum. Read in the comtext of the US legal tradition in which it was written and the way the prior English common law tradition was incorporated into that tradition, it is...rather unambiguous. (Most notably, its exactly how the Supreme Court had applied the principles of English common law involved in multiple citizenship cases before the 14th Amendment establishing a uniform Constitutional rule for birthright citizenship was drafted and ratified. )
> If they can get the SCOTUS to reconsider United States v. Wong Kim Ark from 1898 it could go either way.
Sure, if they can get the court to ignore the clear meaning of “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the context in which it was written, it can go either way. But Wong Kim Ark isn't like Roe and the line of cases descended from it, its not controversial even within the kind of conservative legal tradition that dominates the court.
The Trump Administration could probably get such a case before the Court if it really wanted to, but even this court I can’t see splitting more favorably to overturning the status quo on this point than 8-1 against.
Before the bonkers immunity decision I would have agreed with this. Since then, though, I don't trust SCOTUS on any decision that involves conservative policy. This may come up sooner than expected; Trump has issued an EO attempting to nullify it: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/prot...
There is nothing bonkers about it. Should Obama be subject to prosecution for murder for allowing the bombing of a US citizen in the Middle East? Or should he be immune because he was engaging in an official act as President to protect the US?
Neither, he should not be criminally liable for that, not because he has immunity invented by a Court in clear defiance of the Constitution, but because the act is, in fact, legal pursuant to the 9/11 AUMF.
That the decision is wrong is pretty clear from the Constitution itself: where it intends there to be a Constitutional legal immunity for official acts for Constitutional officers, it explicitly states it (e.g., the speech and debate clause in Article I.) The absence of any such statement for the President and the narrow one provided for members of Congress make it clear that creating a broad Presidential official act immunity ex nihilo for the President is contrary to and an inversion of the Constitutional design, putting a single actor above the law rather than bound by it.
No, you're wrong. No law from Congress can supersede the Constitution and Obama is not criminally liable because of the Constitution, not because of the law you state. You can't create a law that deprives an individual of his constitutional rights.
However, presidential immunity did give Obama the ability to launch a drone strike against him in the name of national security. He could basically execute the individual and was protected because of his presidential immunity.
Immunity is implied by the Constitution because of separation of powers, and it's been a long-held policy that the president has immunity so that he can do his duties without fear of criminal or civil prosecution, and this is a perfect example of this.
The only thing SCOTUS did was make it clear that the President does have immunity when conducting official acts. This was something that was long-held policy but never officially declared until last year.
The president is obviously immune for official acts! You think Georgia should now be able to prosecute Biden for recklessly causing the death of Laken Riley?
It’s not the Supreme Court’s fault that Jack Smith charged Trump based in part on his instructions to his own DOJ. A smart prosecutor would’ve written an indictment based purely on conduct that was obviously unofficial acts, which the Supreme Court held was not protected.
The distinction in the executive order is between "a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident" and everyone else, not just citizen vs. noncitizen or lawful vs. unlawful. As drafted, the children of other lawful immigrants (H-1, J-1, O-1, L-1, etc.) would also not receive birthright citizenship. I've quoted the exact language for the father. The language for the mother is different but seems almost equivalent, excluding "lawful but temporary" status.
I don't expect this to be upheld. Many tech workers will be affected if it somehow is, though.
US citizen by birth, but my parents weren't LPRs or citizens at the time I was born (1986).. they later received green cards and then citizenship in the late 1990s/early aughts.
I recognize that it's unlikely that this part of the order would stand in the end, but in the meantime is it plausible I might run into issues in interactions w/ the federal government? ('the fight is the point') Are there any documents I should get in order that might help? (already have my passport, having trouble track down original visa documents for my parents from when they first came to the US in the 70s)
The order "shall apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order", so you're unaffected even if the order were somehow upheld.
A future child in your situation would not gain American citizenship, and I think you asked a legitimate question. The immigration system is particularly sensitive to executive power, and thus likely to show the biggest near-term effects.
I've read a few different standards for revoking birthright:
1. Probably the weakest notion is to revoke birthright going forward on children born in US to parents without legal status.
2. A stronger notion seems to be the revocation of birthright going forward on children born in the US to parents with green cards but not yet US citizenship. This seems to be a popular form of jus sanguinis in some EU countries.
3. I'm not sure how serious is the talk about revocation of birthright retroactively for all those born on US soil but to parents who at the time only had green cards.
Does anyone have an idea of the momentum behind the stronger forms of revocation?
