I don't know if it was "addressed", but it couldn't have been "rebutted", because this is basically axiomatic.
Loper doesn't overturn specific delegations of power to regulators; doing so would basically neuter the entire executive branch. What it says is that when there's ambiguity about a statute --- such as when a telecommunications bill that barely mentions the Internet and appears to view it in approximately the same light as TMBG's "Dial-a-Song" is used as the basis for sweeping Internet regulation --- the courts are no longer required to take the regulator's word for it.
There's nothing wrong with delegations of power. They just need to be specific; they should represent a legibly expressed intent of the democratically elected legislative branch, which is the branch that the framers created specifically to craft legislation.
Loper doesn't overturn specific delegations of power to regulators; doing so would basically neuter the entire executive branch. What it says is that when there's ambiguity about a statute --- such as when a telecommunications bill that barely mentions the Internet and appears to view it in approximately the same light as TMBG's "Dial-a-Song" is used as the basis for sweeping Internet regulation --- the courts are no longer required to take the regulator's word for it.
There's nothing wrong with delegations of power. They just need to be specific; they should represent a legibly expressed intent of the democratically elected legislative branch, which is the branch that the framers created specifically to craft legislation.