> I think the argument is that a powerful Prime Minister is not really subordinated to parliament- that Merkel does not, in practice, really answer to the party, but instead the party answers to her.
Merkel always governed as leader of a coalition - mostly a “grand coalition” with the traditional main left-wing party (the SPD), although her second cabinet was a coalition with the classically liberal FDP instead. So, forget about answering to her own party - if at any point her coalition partners had felt it was in their political self-interest to do so, they could have collapsed the government.
I think this argument is really drawing on the fact that Merkel was genuinely popular with the German electorate, which protected her against any desire by her party or coalition partners to push her out - they knew the electorate would punish them if they tried.
But, true power does not depend on popularity, it continues even when people don’t like you any more. A US President may become despised by both Congress and the voters, yet to remove them before their term is up, Congress needs to allege actual wrongdoing (as opposed to just “we don’t like you any more”) and needs a super-majority. By contrast, an unpopular German Chancellor can be removed by their party and/or coalition partners, before the end of the electoral term, without needing any parliamentary super-majority or specific allegations of wrongdoing. In that sense the German Chancellor is subject to the Bundestag, to a much greater extent than any US President is subject to Congress.
Merkel always governed as leader of a coalition - mostly a “grand coalition” with the traditional main left-wing party (the SPD), although her second cabinet was a coalition with the classically liberal FDP instead. So, forget about answering to her own party - if at any point her coalition partners had felt it was in their political self-interest to do so, they could have collapsed the government.
I think this argument is really drawing on the fact that Merkel was genuinely popular with the German electorate, which protected her against any desire by her party or coalition partners to push her out - they knew the electorate would punish them if they tried.
But, true power does not depend on popularity, it continues even when people don’t like you any more. A US President may become despised by both Congress and the voters, yet to remove them before their term is up, Congress needs to allege actual wrongdoing (as opposed to just “we don’t like you any more”) and needs a super-majority. By contrast, an unpopular German Chancellor can be removed by their party and/or coalition partners, before the end of the electoral term, without needing any parliamentary super-majority or specific allegations of wrongdoing. In that sense the German Chancellor is subject to the Bundestag, to a much greater extent than any US President is subject to Congress.