I agree that’s another relevant framing, although once again it is a moral question, and hence not within the proper scope of the natural sciences to answer.
But, even if one were to agree that a woman has a right to bodily autonomy which outweighs the right of her unborn child to life, how does that apply to a case like the one I referred to, of a termination at >= 37 weeks for a maternal psychosocial indication? If the mother didn’t want the child, why not permit it to be born alive, then put it up for adoption? It seems clear that particular line of argument, whether or not it is correct, is insufficient to justify the law and practice of the state of Victoria, Australia (and the same may possibly be true of some other jurisdictions as well.)
But, even if one were to agree that a woman has a right to bodily autonomy which outweighs the right of her unborn child to life, how does that apply to a case like the one I referred to, of a termination at >= 37 weeks for a maternal psychosocial indication? If the mother didn’t want the child, why not permit it to be born alive, then put it up for adoption? It seems clear that particular line of argument, whether or not it is correct, is insufficient to justify the law and practice of the state of Victoria, Australia (and the same may possibly be true of some other jurisdictions as well.)