Once again, it seems that it was an excuse to weaken the security of all iPhone users rather than getting information from a specific device. In the case of San Bernandino the FBI was able to use Cellebrite to crack the attacker iPhone without Apple creating backdoors.
In that case, Apple already had a backdoor, or they wouldn't have been able to comply in the first place: the device in question did not yet have the "secure enclave" enforcement of pin code back-off and supported firmware updates by Apple without the user's pin code. Apple spending the time to make a firmware--which incidentally anyone with Apple's private firmware signing key (the real back door) could easily have done (as we seriously already have had custom firmwares for ssh bootstrap and pin code brute force in the community)--isn't them "creating" a backdoor, it is them "using" a backdoor. Thankfully, it is my understanding that Apple decided to fix both of these issues in subsequent devices, and so while there are clearly still bugs there hopefully are no longer any obvious backdoors.
>Thankfully, it is my understanding that Apple decided to fix both of these issues in subsequent devices, and so while there are clearly still bugs there hopefully are no longer any obvious backdoors.
Does this mean. There's a new unpatched exploit out there that greykey is using?
From what I can tell, it simply tries to brute force the password (perhaps with some informed suggestion). It does appear to have access to an exploit that bypasses/disables the encryption lock that wipes data off the phone after failed attempts, but it does not appear to utilize an exploit/backdoor to gain access to the device; it gains access the "legitimate" way.
