Can you elaborate on AF447? I’ve never heard of the AoA sensors being connected with that crash, and a quick search indicates that they were working fine.
I've confused AF447's Pitot tubes with AoA sensors. But I think point is still valid: two sensors _can_ simultaneously have same erroneous readings and we have to be sure pilots can handle such situations.
First: I said it’s very unlikely, not impossible. Second: the failure of AF447’s pitot tubes was detected immediately and the system switched to an alternate law as a result; this contributed to the crash because the pilots were less familiar with how the system operated in that mode. Third: AoA sensors operate by a completely different mechanism so even if this was what happened (it wasn’t) this demonstrates nothing relevant.
You’re just badly arguing details while ignoring the actual point here.
> With two sensors, you can detect failure. It’s very unlikely that both would fail simultaneously. If they did, it’s very unlikely that both would provide the same erroneous readings.
> First: I said it’s very unlikely, not impossible.
> You’re just badly arguing details while ignoring the actual point here.
My point here was that with two AoA sensors you can't reliably detect failure. They can both fail simultaneously and provide the same erroneous readings. And because it's not that unlikely we have to be sure that pilots can handle MCAS problems when two AoA sensors fail.
> Second: the failure of AF447’s pitot tubes was detected immediately
Because A330 have three pitot tubes, right? Not two out of two sensors?
I'm not arguing about AF447 case, I gave it as an example that two sensors _can_ have same erroneous readings.
Airbus engineers were not sure that can happen in real life, so stall warning issue was a real surprise for them.
