From my understanding of the EFF's argument, yes - and they are arguing that the government cannot compel Apple to express themselves in a manner contrary to their views (and thus they can't compel code signing).
I'm sort of asking if EFF's argument is legally sound. Is code-signing expressive in this case, or merely functional? Is it rather Apple's intent to communicate endorsement that transforms code-signing into an expressive act, that when it's compelled, it's not expressive?
Even if they preface their action with "is it not our intent to endorse this, we're only doing it to make it function" they know damn well that all the other iPhones in the world, to which this speech isn't intended to be heard by but could potentially be heard by later, will infer/interpret it as an endorsement. Knowledge of an obvious likelihood of a particular inference despite claimed lack of intent is a form of intent.
