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It would all be more convincing if the incidents so far didn't seem to be facilitated by an outrageous level of negligence.

We had OpenAI "accidentally" run an entire swarm of 10,000 agents apparently for weeks, on a security related task, seemingly totally unsupervised, hacking all over the internet - all the conversations were completely visible, anybody who looked would have seen it. But they didn't.

So before we start regulating innocent parties, maybe let's start by taking some direct action against the specific ones that appear to be behaving with criminal levels of negligence.


The "sandbox" they used was apparently made of thin paper exposed under a day of heavy rain, too. You'd think, if they truly believed the model is so dangerous, they'd run it in a VM without a network adapter.

I brought this up to someone else and was told that airgapping is apparently much more expensive than I'd naively think.

I still think this is a sign that they are not taking their own rhetoric seriously.


Agents need packages like the rest of us. Ruby gems, npm packages, Maven, pip, docker images..

Not surprised this is always what they have and hack.

Who would use an Agent that spends $10,000 re-implementing some OAuth lib or reverse-engineering a proprietary lib when it's free on the internet?


You don't need a full air gap. Set up a microVM with network access limited to local network and send all package requests through a filtering gateway that only allows normal download endpoints. Or self host a big collection of popular packages if you need extra security.

Isn't that exactly what they did? The bots could only access the jfrog instance, so they hacked jfrog?

No that's not what they did, they exposed jfrog raw. It would have been so extremely simple to gate services they need the llm to access... I mean, jfrog was not written with this kind of threat model in mind, and neither were a lot of other tools

Right, you mean it didn't go through a gateway? But would that actually have helped? The requests all went through jfrog didn't they? I guess it depends on the level of filtering at the gateway?

Whilst it might not be JFrog's threat model, I wouldn't assume it can be used as a full internet proxy.

I don't really mean to defend OpenAI here, but they did make some attempts at sandboxing. Although it does seem that they didn't really know what they were doing.


> Agents need packages like the rest of us. Ruby gems, npm packages, Maven, pip, docker images..

Yes, yes they do, but read through artifact proxies are dodgy as fuck, which is why and facebook (and I assume a fuckload others) don't have them.

Also semi-airgapped labs are a lot less expensive than you think at that scale. Once you have to do multi-region VLANs with machine certs before you get access to juicy VLANs, the difference between "no internet for you" and "mostly airgapped" falls to almost zero.

Also I would want an artifact mirror because a) that give a good signal about how the model reacts, and what training material its latched onto, b) it hides what the models are doing from the outside.


There was and continues to be no reason to share the package manager between models. This was begging for abuse.

it's really weird to hear frontier labs say "our internal models are basically AGI" while also saying "airgapping is too hard uwu".

if your internal models are so damn good, they should be able to "one shot" airgapping... right?


It's expensive if it wasn't part of the planning and design. The same as 'security' is expensive, or compliance with regulations is expensive.

It is also a choice to not do any or all of the above.


> I brought this up to someone else and was told that airgapping is apparently much more expensive than I'd naively think.

These labs are one of the most valuable and heavily funded enterprises in the whole world, that they can't properly air-gap their systems to me reads as if their "agents" and LLMs are not as good as they say they are, because if they were, why would it be hard/expensive to air gap a system? They already scraped most if not all of the internet, where did that data go?


Not that airgapping is expensive so much as it's really, really inconvenient once you take it seriously. You need to build special rooms for it, you can't just API out to a datacenter. You need to have processes for requesting data be sent into the box. And so on.

I feel like there is a reasonable compromise between "yeah they have full internet access" and "separate airgapped rooms that require multiple levels of authorization to access" that would make this a lot better without that much more work. I feel like they're doing it intentionally to show how dangerous these models are and that the government must step in and protect them

> You'd think, if they truly believed the model is so dangerous...

They would have been watching what it does, especially when running it on ExploitGym of all benchmarks... that is criminal worthy neglegence


yes, that is the kicker

These same people who supposedly believe these agents pose an existential threat to humanity apparently fired up 10,000 of them and left them unsupervised for weeks.


Look at the post-incident investigation: https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-inciden...

While I do think OpenAI were negligent in not developing the harness that would allow to understand better what's happening close to realtime, I'd say "anybody who looked" in that case would probably be someone with another swarm tasked with analysis, it's no longer "glanceable" in a traditional sense.


I don't understand why hugging face is not getting more shit too. It is extremely embarrassing to get owned because you are letting arbitrary programs/users call out to the open web from the infra

Sounds like advertising platforms. Spraying malware and links to scam sites all over the place.

"They" don't care about the end-people. "They" care about maximising their profit thing, in a vacuum.


I agree, it is very dangerous that it seems like there is not going to be accountability for these incidents - from either legal or regulatory point of view. In fact, I would say that is the main danger. If someone was in jail right now due to this incident, I think we can safely say every other player would be reassessing their safety protocols, and I would feel quite OK about the situation. The fact that we have zero repercussions sends exactly the opposite signal, and I do NOT feel ok.

It seems like all this happened in the same time period earlier this year. It makes me wonder if all of these were part of a single larger incident where multiple experiments were run with insufficient or missing constraints or an unknowningly misaligned model.

This idea of remotely hosting the agent harness is honestly backwards to what I need.

In so many cases, all the friction is about how to provision access to local data so the agent can work. So you started with the problem of how do I integrate an agent that is running locally with data that is hosted locally, and you have to deal with a bunch of security, data sensitivity and management issues around that. Now you moved the agent to a remote host - pretty much all your problems are worse: now I have a remote agent reaching into my infrastructure to deal with.

I'd much rather the inverse of this: let me run the agent local but provide secure remote hosted sandboxes. That actually solves a real problem because the sandbox running locally means breaking out of it directly intersects your local infra, whereas if it runs in a managed hosted environment I can leave the provisioning and management of that to someone else.


Agreed about the harness. I went a different way: run a handful of agents in parallel with an isolated environment per agent. Once you get past a few, it's pretty easy and gets pretty fast to stand up. It's less isolation than you talk about here, but more than enough for what I'm doing.

The end goal is not you watching what the agent is doing, verifying, then accepting its changes. In the ideal scenario of automation, the agent does it on your request, doesn't matter wherever you are.

Kind of slack-button-click-to-fix-something workflow.


The self hosted workers solve this use case. The control plane sits in OAI's cloud, but the actual tool calls are executed in your worker fleet. The main problem with this approach is that tool arg's get sent over the wire, and those often contain code/data.

While this result does imply there was some training on the reasoning trace and output of GPT 5.5, it doesn't tell us how much of the source of its training it was (even a small amount of post training could bump up the correlations in this way). And it doesn't tell us how much it is more a stylistic influence rather than being a genuine lifting over of intelligence.

In general, I'm fairly ambivalent about demonising training on model outputs. I think in doing so we are more defending proprietary commercial interests of these companies than we are defending any genuine moral principle. We should be careful therefore about over interpreting results like this.


Is this just Google precomputing Alpha genome values - which were already accessible via API and making them available as another API (presumably more broadly)? Or is there actually new information?

That’s my reading. (That this is a cached database of Alpha values)

wouldn't it be interesting if nVidia buying hugging face was part of hushing up the fallout there

On the face of it, they would have very good cause for some action there, assuming they wanted to.


> Sorry, I guess we will put up better guardrails next time

Or, if you are Anthropic:

> This illustrates the risks posed by open models!


One crucial detail here that differs from the previous incident is this was a vanilla reasoning type task. Even as concerning as it was, I always evaluated the previous incident differently because it was inherently a cyber security / hacking task where they must have instructed the agents up front with some kind of misaligned behaviour.

Absent that, if we assume this is just trying to bolster generic reasoning then there's no context around it that helps to forgive misaligned behaviour. If OpenAI ran these agents with safeguards off then that seems wreckless on their part. If they didn't do that, then it says the models are executing significantly misaligned behaviour even in a generic context.

Either way it seems to suggest some pretty concerning things about OpenAI's methodology.


"It's okay because we did it with an Agent" is the new "it's okay because we did it with an App." Both because it's used to circumvent regulation, and because the underlying technology creates a smokescreen in dialogue among techies.

Let's imagine I made a new website but, instead of using a database, I abused some random old forum site and created new pages on that forum for each row of data. You'd call that abusive, yes? I'd be an asshole, yes? And the fact that my website was really cool and techy would have no sway on the fact that I'd be an asshole, yes?

Well then why does OpenAI's abusive behavior get discussed in these terms? Whether it was a "reasoning type task" or whether they "instructed misaligned behavior" is irrelevant. Nobody should care. Discussing OpenAI's behavior in these terms is just a distraction from the problem at hand.


If you actually accomplish something like this your post will be on top of HN and discussed with reverence.

Source: Every Tom7 video.

I am not saying someone trying to run this as production would not be an asshole, but the technical feat is amazing. I don't see the difference between Tom7's harder hard disk video and this. Of course this is a bug in the agent but it's a fascinating bug and no one is being an asshole on purpose.

Now I will wash my fingers with bleach because I just defended the OpenAI.


A harder drive made out of neglected wikis and forums. I hate it so much I might actually try to make it, just to prove a point.

Interesting. So there’s no “they were told to hack” excuse here.

There is something fundamentally wrong with their reward function, this is pretty classic paperclip territory. And even knowing that, I expect we’ll need to see legal action with teeth against the labs before changes start being made internally.


From the report, they also tried to impersonate the moderators and perform XSS attacks (report says "unclear why they would do this at all"). So not just using a static message board either, but actively interfering with oversight.

OpenAI also found sandbox breaking behavior on a broken biology eval apparently. The evidence suggests it’s more strongly downstream of unsolvable tasks, than the hacking prompt.

Anthropic have also observed similar things, so while it seems to me that OpenAI’s level of control is more of a dumpster fire, it’s by no means a unique issue to them.


It's almost as if it's not actually possible to align an unknowable mystery box of floats.

Good thing we're not trying to deploy them into fully autonomous weapons or anything....

I wouldn’t take the fatalistic stance that it’s fully impossible - but it’s certainly impossible to align a model while racing as fast as any technological paradigm shift has ever raced.

Vue had a good tenure as a solid #2 to React, so I think it probably has got a lot of representation in training data. Things really splitered after that but it got a good foothold.

The problem I see with vue is what vue patterns are you using. And the llms may be trained on more outdated ones more than current practices.

Agree. It wasn't as drastic but I think Vue did the 2=>3 update at an unfortunate time. They lost a lot of users along the way but they also confused a lot of the LLM training too, I am sure.

Still, I have great success with it, especially with Typescript.


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