I don't disagree with the thrust of your criticism of the dynamic (especially long term). But there is a legitimate concern that the first test cases to hit the courts need to be quite unsympathetic egregious violators rather than surveillance dynamics that have been thoroughly normalized for decades. If people start bringing private suits against neighbors that have deployed Amazon surveillance cameras, "credit bureaus", private investigators, big tech surveillance companies directly (eg Google, and especially with weak legal arguments), it is likely to set some poor precedents and create political pushback.
Section 2 already limits applicability to persons collecting or processing data on not less than 60,000 consumers, so suits brought against neighbors would be (rightfully) dismissed.
The concern about poor precedent stemming from poor cases has some rational sense, but we have the benefit of experience. Empirically it just hasn't tended to play out like that in the case of consumer protection statutes in MA. One reason this doesn't happen in practice might be the limited bandwidth of the appellate process. The SJC could (and likely would) prioritize answering questions about the statute in the context of cases brought by the AG.
The longevity pro-consumer laws in MA provides some good empirical data that cuts against the concern about push-back.
B should have standing from the park designation creating a public easement. I'm guessing the deed restrictions are pretty thin, and that pages++ of legalese would have done a better job. But this is the exact dynamic that everyone (rightly) hates attorneys for, both on the giving side ($$$ to hire an attorney to copypasta all that crap), as well as on the receiving side (pages of legalese are bound to create a bunch of extra facets to be dealt with by both the city and residents). Rather than the same rough type of structure needing to be reinvented over and over out of common law cloth, we really need reform aimed at defining commonly understood constructs that can simply be instantiated by reference.
Your math on the house seems off by a factor of 4? But 30% utilization seems high, as that would be a $2k/mo electric bill at 20 cents/kWh.
Reframing what you're saying, that would be a connection fee that worked out to just under 12 cents per kWh used for the first year, which seems both somewhat reasonable but also probably not going to move the needle much on the large deployments?
Yes, but using the 30% utilization factor I get 200A * 240V * 30% = 14.4kW , meaning a $14400 connection fee rather than $3600 ? $3600 would be a 7.5% utilization factor.
And yes, I got the one time fee aspect. My point is that if you're basing this off of expected utilization (rather than say the size of the service regardless of how much energy is used), and that expected utilization is roughly correct, then that one time fee can be thought of as amortized cost per unit energy over a specified amount of time. And that cost isn't even that high if amortized over a year.
It's hard to take a piece of writing seriously when it bashes "woke" with one hand, while presenting an abstract defense of conservatism with the other. That's a massive contradiction that will let one prove anything, ala Gödel. And when you subtract out the rest of this post's meandering through the same old culture war dog whistles, there doesn't seem to be much else here.
If it's actually usable economically then the government will partially recover (capture value) it via taxation. If US suppliers fail to match the predicted effects, then Chinese or other suppliers can. This yields tax receipts in China and elsewhere. So if it's actually 'distributable' then it is worth at least some non-zero capturable amount as sales to foreign governments if the US government will not be participating, even if you suppose no private entities will buy the information.
It seems you've completely lost the plot. Refer to what we're replying to
>Can you think of any economically valuable reason why it might be important to know about weather trends or events in advance? Any at all?
You're damning me for questioning someone who presumed market efficiency with an appeal to economic value to a government that stands to capture that hypothetical value? The premise of the government acting on market efficiency was what I responded to, not my introduction.
If we're discounting the premised market efficiency of the government actor to which I replied, then the question was moot, and you're targeting the wrong commenter. But of course, that wouldn't fit your two-faced (and post response underhanded conniving editing 'centrally-') rebuttal, so you wait to set the catch-22 trap of damning rebuttal comments for acting on a premise introduced in a counter viewpoint.
The comment you originally responded to does not presume market efficiency. In fact it carries the opposite assumption - if markets were efficient then the loss of economic value from weather forecasting would be immediately apparent and we wouldn't need to discuss larger-concept models with the goal of overcoming inefficiencies.
That original comment posits an idea of "economic value" that is independent from what can be captured by whomever is contributing to it, which is what you seemed to be rejecting.
The market efficiency it presumes is that an appeal to value is actually a rational actionable appeal to the government actor. That seems to be the whole point of the question (paraphrased) "can't you see the value of the thing we're losing" and speaking that to someone who stands to capture the value via tax receipts.
Of course if the government doesn't care at all about the 'market efficiency' of that value it's not clear why this question is even posed -- a hypothetically irrational rejection of the efficient projection of this value seems to be what the question contends with. The very question relies on a premise of someone somewhere acting with market efficiency on this data. With zero market 'efficiency' from the data, there's no useful market value generated whether you frame it as "capturable" or not.
> The market efficiency it presumes is that an appeal to value is actually a rational actionable appeal to the government actor. That seems to be the whole point of the question (paraphrased) "can't you see the value of the thing we're losing" and speaking that to someone who stands to capture the value via tax receipts.
Ah, no, but at least this puts our difference in stark relief. One can rationally appeal to government (as a democratic institution with a goal of furthering lofty ideals, like society and the economy in general) without necessarily appealing to government (as a selfish entity) desire to collect more tax receipts. If you must, think of it as appealing to individuals who may or may not support the government, and the government optimizing for that support rather than optimizing for mere tax dollars (which it can always print more of).
So you're back to to "fallacy" of market efficiency, expecting private actors to advocate to foot taxes with an expected ROI from capturing the value delivered by government implementation of the program. Yes you can appeal to the government without appealing to tax receipts, but under a value proposition premise we have here it's conditional upon the market being 'efficient' enough that either the private actors realize the tax / inflation paid is worth the ROI and/or the government finds it worth the tax receipts -- a value proposition doesn't make sense if none of the actors expect to realize it.
It seems your thesis here contradicts your prior argument. You're merely flip-flopping -- the private actors are acting with "efficiency" when one argues about government efficiency and the government is the one acting with efficiency when you're arguing the private actors aren't.
>Ah, no, but at least this puts our difference in stark relief.
It does nothing of the sort.
The reason why I introduce the notion of tax receipts is in part because some arguments presented appeared to dismiss the "efficiency" of private actors while still asking me to answer the question of how a private actor might "capture" the value of generating the data themselves even in the face of private buyers not buying it (one answer is: foreign governments or those they represent might be "efficient" enough to buy it). You've grasped onto that notion as if it's a "gotcha" presenting some stark difference. In fact it creates no obligation for the government to act solely on tax receipts, it's merely one more value proposition for a non-private actor to buy the data.
Not much point going much further down this "heads I win, tails you lose" flip-flop reasoning you're presenting, but good luck with that. You've created a logical contradiction at this point no matter which side you try to flip back to.
> So you're back to to "fallacy" of market efficiency, expecting private actors to advocate to foot taxes with an expected ROI from capturing the value delivered
Or I'm pointing to the existence of arguments that fall outside of your paradigm of reasoning through direct economic self interest.
I'd guess the flip flopping you're feeling here comes from trying to shoehorn my argument into your paradigm, and it not fitting. The resulting logical contradiction does not imply an error in my argument, but rather the inapplicability of the paradigm you're attempting to use.
>The resulting logical contradiction does not imply an error in my argument, but rather the inapplicability of the paradigm you're attempting to use.
This is a diabolical level of gaslighting to present your logical contradiction as my fault. Perhaps the "shoehorning" you're finding is in fact a function of forcing your reasoning into the premise of appeal to economic value to which I responded while simultaneously damning my response in a way that created a contradiction in your logic.
>>Can you think of any economically valuable reason why it might be important to know about weather trends or events in advance? Any at all?
The whole premise of this was appeal to the economic interest of constituents of the people ending the program.
If you want to pretend like we're addressing an entirely different "argument" in whatever la-la land is existing in your mind right now, so that you can seriously make your statement, I'm not particularly interested in addressing your hallucinatory fantasies. Have a good one.
All you've seem to have done here is push your own favored framework, and then argue reflexively based on it. My initial point was that the assumptions of your framework would seem to be incorrect. You merely translated my point into your framework, and then blamed me for the resulting logical contradiction.
The specific problem here is imagining market participants as efficient actors. In reality, it's more like an NP-hard problem, and making logical appeals based around abstract models is exactly how we try to convince other market participants that something is in their interest (eg the comment you originally responded to).
In general, there was no need to come out swinging at me and accusing me of "gaslighting". Try more understanding, and less arguing. You'll get further.
No, this is specious. I've tried to have conversations with reactionaries on topics that we both are even aligned on. It would always be crickets the moment I deviated from the reactionary talking points. The elusive point of view that is "not grasped" is merely some combination of religious fundamentalism and spiteful destruction. Which are both ultimately just rooted in stupidity.
I'm sorry to say, but this is a losing position, as in one you only adopt when you've already lost and are trying to bargain. It presupposes that the AI companies are unregulateable, and that the only possible avenue of influence/dividend is through ownership. Contrast with the traditional idea that when companies create harm, the government works to stop that harm by default. Or that if these companies actually do succeed at rolling up up the distributed economy into a handful of centralized companies, the government steps in to tax their outsized gains to preserve some semblance of a distributed economy. Furthermore, what does said "ownership" actually do ? If the government is unable to regulate these companies, then it is also unable to reliably exercise a voting interest or insist on receiving dividends - if the companies are this powerful, then whoever actually controls them can always alter the terms and reject the "owners'" demands.
It's a false statistic because the US has pretty terrible waiting times as well. Here we're just told that we have "choice", so those waiting times become our own responsibility rather than the system's.
So that seems like something that should be easily dealt with in a few minutes - request that they present their US passport, apprise them of the fine for entering without having obtained a US passport, and/or turn them away since their entry would be illegal. None of these require hours of questioning in a back room.
I'm tired of this trend of people using a violation of the law, especially administrative style infractions, as a justification for arbitrary horribleness.
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